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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XVI DECEMBER, 1930 No. I
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CHAPTERS 1 AND 2,*
WITH MISSOURI ANNOTATIONSt
BY TYRRELL WILLIAMS
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
On May 20, 1929, the American Law Institute officially ap-
proved the first seven chapters (sections 1-177) of the Restate-
ment of the Law of Contracts. In his introduction to a special
Pennsylvania edition of a portion of the Restatement of Con-
tracts, Hon. George Wharton Pepper said:
The term "Restatement" is used because the object of the
Institute is to state again in an orderly way those legal
propositions which, although already stated by the courts,
are scattered widely and buried deeply. The "Reporter"
selected by the Institute to become primarily responsible
for the Restatement of the Law of Contracts is Mr. Samuel
Williston, author of the well-known textbook which bears
his name. Assisted by an organized group of "advisers"
he has prepared several tentative drafts of the Restatement
and all these have been subjected to the scrutiny of the
thirty-three representative lawyers who compose the Coun-
cil and have passed the corporate test of critical discussion
by the assembled membership of the Institute.
The Missouri Bar Association has assumed responsibility for
preparing Missouri Annotations to the Restatements of Con-
tracts and of Conflict of Laws. Assistance in this work is now
being rendered by the faculties of the law schools of the Uni-
* Copyright, 1928, The American Law Institute.
t Copyright, 1930, by Washington University.
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versity of Missouri, St. Louis University, and Washington Uni-
versity. Particular portions of the two Restatements have been
assigned for annotations to designated members of these fac-
ulties. In the following pages appear the official text of the first
two chapters (sections 1-18) including comments and illustra-
tions, as already published by the American Law Institute, and
also the corresponding Missouri Annotations (now in tentative
form) prepared by Tyrrell Williams, Professor of Law, Wash-
ington University School of Law, and submitted to the Missouri
Bar Association.
Chapter I
MEANING OF'TERMS
Section 1. CONTRACT DEFINED.
A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty.
Comment:
a. A contract may consist of a single promise by one person
to another, or of mutual promises by two persons to one another;
or there may be, indeed, any number of persons or any number
of promises. One person may make several promises to one
person or to several persons, or several persons may join in
making a single promise to one or more persons. It is essential,
however, for the formation of a single contract that all the prom-
ises shall form part of a set. In other words they must be parts
of a single transaction.
b. It is not practicable in a definition of contract to state all
the operative facts that are necessary or sufficient, or to state all
the legal relations that are created by such facts. These will
appear with greater fullness in the succeeding Chapters and
Sections.
c. It has been pointed out that the word contract is often used
to express indifferently:
1. The acts which create the legal relations between the
parties;
2. A writing which if not itself such an act is the evidence of
such acts;
3. The legal relations resulting from the operative acts.
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As the term is used in the Restatement of this Subject, "con-
tract" includes not only the act of making a promise or prom-
ises but the intangible duties which arise. Similarly "promise,"
under the definition in Section 2, includes not merely the act of
speaking, but the continuous duty, whether moral or legal, which
a promisor assumes when he makes a promise. The separation
is not made in ordinary legal speech, and is not made in the Re-
statement of this Subject, between the physical act of speaking
words of promise and the intangible duties which thereupon
arise.
d. Not all the operative acts which are essential to create
contractual relations between the parties are included in the
definition. It does not attempt to state what acts are essential.
When an act is done as the consideration for a unilateral con-
tract (see Section 12) and is essential to make the promise ob-
ligatory the act is not a part of the promise, and hence is not
part of the contract as contract is here defined. Similarly, de-
livery is necessary to make a sealed promise binding, but delivery
is not part of the contract.
e. The term contract is generic. As commonly used, and as
here defined, it includes varieties described as void, voidable,
unenforceable, formal, informal, express, implied, unilateral,
bilateral. In these varieties neither the operative acts of the
parties nor the resulting relations are identical.
Annotation:
Following Marshall and Blackstone, Missouri courts have de-
scribed a contract as an agreement. Pfaff v. Gruen (1902) 92
Mo. App. 560, 69 S. W. 405; Weinsberg v. St. Louis Cordage Co.(1909) 135 Mo. App. 553, 116 S. W. 461. However, the Restate-
ment's definition is not inconsistent with the substantive law of
Missouri. Since 1825 the official editions of the Missouri
Statutes have contained a chapter headed "Contracts and Prom-
ises." In Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co.(1907) 127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S. W. 777, an alleged contract was
analyzed and the court said: "This measure of the contents of
the promise will be found to coincide in the usual dealings of
men of good faith and ordinary competence, both with the actual
intention of the promisor and with actual expectation of the
promisee." In Strickler v. Consolidated School Dist. (1927)
316 Mo. 621, 291 S. W. 136, an equitable suit to decree and en-
force an alleged contract implied in fact, the court held that
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"where the law prohibits the making of an express promise it
will not imply one."
Procedure. The definition includes contracts actually implied
in fact, but toes not include quasi-contracts which are created
by law without regard to the intention of the parties. However,
it should be remembered that the term contract as used in the
procedural statutes, is broad enough to include quasi-contracts.
"Contract, express or implied," as used in R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec.
1221, relating to petitions, is broad enough to include quasi-con-
tracts. Nicholas v. Hadlock (Mo. App. 1915) 180 S. W. 31.
Contract, as used in R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 1233, relating to coun-
terclaims, includes quasi-contracts. St. Louis School Board v.
Broadway Savings Bank (1884) 84 Mo. 56. Contract in R. S.
Mo. 1919, Sec. 2734, relating to Justices' Courts, includes quasi-
contracts. Redel v. Missouri Valley Stone Co. (1907) 126 Mo.
App. 163, 103 S. W. 568. See Section 5, Comment a.
Promises that are not Contracts. Oftentimes courts have to
recognize promises which are not contracts because there is no
remedy for a breach of them. See Whaley v. Peak (1871) 49
Mo. 80; Bragg v. Israel (1900) 86 Mo. App. 338.
Section 2. PROMISE DEFINED.
(1) A promise is an undertaking, however expressed, either
that something shall happen, or that something shall not happen,
in the future.
(2) Words which in terms promise the happening or failure
to happen of something not within human control, or the exist-
ence or non-existence of a present or past state of facts, are to
be interpreted as a promise or undertaking to be answerable for
such proximate damage as may be caused by the failure to hap-
pen or the happening of the specified event, or by the existence
or non-existence of the asserted state of facts.
Comment:
a. Just as "contract" as used in this Restatement means not
simply the act of promising, but duties arising therefrom, so
"promise" means both physical manifestations by words or acts
of assurance and the moral duty to make good the assurance by
performance. If by virtue of other operative facts the promise
is legally binding, the promise is a contract. The word promise,
though in ordinary use, frequently bears different shades of
meaning. So far as legal conceptions in the law of contracts
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are concerned, it is immaterial whether a party to a contract
undertakes that he will personally do or refrain from doing
something or that he will cause something to come to pass.
Even where the undertaking relates to an existing or past fact,
as in case of a warranty that a horse is sound, or that a ship ar-
rived in a foreign port some days previously, the existence and
validity of the undertaking is dealt with in the same way as if
the warrantor could cause the fact to be as he asserted, though
the meaning of words in terms promising the existence of
present or past facts must be interpreted as stated in Subsec-
tion (2). Such contracts are made when the parties are ignorant
of the actual facts regarding which they bargain, and in view of
their ignorance it is immaterial for purposes of contract that the
actual condition of affairs is irrevocably fixed before the contract
is made.
b. An apparent promise which according to its terms makes
performance optional with the promisor whatever may happen,
or whatever course of conduct in other respects he may pursue,
is in fact no promise. Such an expression is often called an il-
lusory promise.
c. A promise must be distinguished from a statement of in-
tention or of opinion and from a mere prophecy. As an un-
sealed promise is binding only if sufficient consideration is given
for it, except as stated in Sections 85-94, and statements of in-
tention or of opinion or sounding merely in prophecy are not
ordinarily given for consideration, the distinction is not usually
difficult. The problem is, however, frequently presented in de-
termining whether the words of a seller of goods amount to a
warranty.
IMustration.3:
1. A on seeing a house of thoroughly fireproof construc-
tion says to B, the owner, "This house will never burn
down." This is not a promise but merely a prophecy.
2. A, the builder of a house, or the inventor of the material
used in part of its construction, says to B, the owner of the
house, "I warrant that this house will never burn down."
This is in effect a promise to be answerable for any proxi-
mate damage if the house should burn down; and if made
for sufficient consideration is a contract.
3. A says to B, "I will employ you for a year at a salary
of $5000 if I go into business." This is a promise, for
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although it is wholly optional with A to go into business or
not, he does not keep his word if he goes into business with-
out employing B.
4. A says to B that he will employ him for a fixed term at
such salary as A sees fit to pay. This is not a promise to
pay any salary.
Annotation:
This is in accord with the law of Missouri. As justifying
subdivision (1), see Crane v. Murray (1904) 106 Mo. App. 697,
80 S. W. 280, where the court said: "Assumpsit is but another
word for an undertaking or promise."
Subdivision (2) is illustrated by a warranty in the sale of
chattels. Thompson v. Botts (1844) 8 Mo. 710, warranty of
soundness in slave sold.
Section 3. AGREEMENT DEFINED.
An agreement is an expression of mutual assent by two or
more persons.
Comment:
a. Agreement has a wider meaning than contract, bargain or
promise. The word contains no implication that legal conse-
quences are or are not produced. It applies to transactions
executed on one or both sides, and also to those that are wholly
executory.
Annotation:
Michael v. Kennedy (1912) 166 Mo. App. 462, 148 S. W. 983
contains a dictum that there is no difference between a contract
and an agreement. But many Missouri cases have distinctly
held that there was no contract in spite of a clear agreement.
See Bragg v. Israel (1900) 86 Mo. App. 338, agreement by mar-
ried woman before common law of femme covert was abolished.
Section 4. BARGAIN DEFINED.
A bargain is an agreement of two or more persons to exchange
promises or performances.
Comment:
a. Bargain has a narrower meaning than agreement, since it
is applicable only to a particular class of agreements. It has
a broader meaning than contract, because it includes not only
transactions of which a promise forms a part, but also com-
pletely executed transactions such as exchanges of goods (bar-
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ters) or of services, or sales where goods have been transferred
and the price paid for them. It also includes transactions where
one party makes a promise and the other gives something in ex-
change which is insufficient consideration.
Annotation:
This definition is not inconsistent with the law of Missouri.
In Vorchetto v. Sappenfield (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d)
685, bargain means a contract consummated on both sides.
Section 5. How A PROMISE MAY BE MADE.
Except as stated in Section 72 (2), a promise in a contract
must be stated in such words either oral or written, or must be
inferred wholly or partly from such conduct, as justifies the
promisee in understanding that the promisor intended to make
a promise.
Comment:
a. Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied. The
distinction involves, however, no difference in legal effect, but
lies merely in the mode of manifesting assent. Implied con-
tracts must be distinguished from quasi-contracts, which also
have often been called implied contracts or contracts implied in
law. Quasi-contracts, unlike true contracts, are not based on
the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the per-
formances in question, nor are they promises. They are obliga-
tions created by law for reasons of justice. Such obligations
were ordinarily enforced at common law in the same form of
action (assumpsit) that was appropriate to true contracts, and
some confusion with reference to the nature of quasi-contracts
has been caused thereby.
Illustrations:
1. A telephones to his grocer, "Send me a barrel of flour."
The grocer sends it. A has thereby contracted to pay a
reasonable price therefor.
2. A, on passing a market, where he has an account, sees
a box of apples marked "5 cts. each." A picks up an apple,
holds it up so that a clerk of the establishment sees the act.
The clerk nods, and A passes on. A has contracted to pay
five cents for the apple.
3. A's wife, B, separates from A for justifiable cause,
and, in order to secure necessary clothing and supplies,
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charges their cost to A. A is bound, though he has given
notice not to furnish his wife with such supplies; but his
duty is quasi-contractual, not contractual.
Annotation:
This is in accord with the law of Missouri. Hoggard v. Dick-
erson (1914) 180 Mo. App. 70, 165 S. W. 1135 indicates a differ-
ence between express contracts and contracts implied in fact.
Anderson v. Caldwell (1912) 242 Mo. 201, 146 S. W. 444 indi-
cates a difference between contracts implied in fact and quasi-
contracts. In Weinsberg v. St. Louis Cordage Company (1909)
135 Mo. App. 553, 116 S. W. 461, the court said: "Much confu-
sion has been introduced by loose expression touching implied
contracts and frequently the distinction which obtains, ac-
curately speaking, between contracts implied by the law and
contracts implied by or inferred from the facts, is overlooked.
A contract implied by law is to be distinguished from an actual
contract found from facts, in that there is no actual meeting of
the minds of the parties. Such is frequently termed a con-
structive contract."
Section 6. CONTRACTS CLASSIFIED.
Contracts are classified as formal or informal; as unilateral
or bilateral.
Annotation:
The classification of contracts as formal and informal, as de-
fined in Sections 7 and 8, has not been recognized in the Missouri
decisions. See Sec. 7. The classification of contracts as uni-
lateral and bilateral, with the Restatement's meaning, has been
recognized in some Missouri decisions. See Sec. 12.
Other Classifications. The classification of contracts as
specialties and simple contracts has often been made. See
County of Montgomery v. Auchley (1887) 92 Mo. 126, 4 S. W.
425. From this case it is apparent that a simple contract in
Missouri is the informal contract of the Restatement.
The common classification of contracts as, (a) express, (b)
implied in fact, and (c) implied in law (constructive, quasi-con-
tract), is explained in Weinsberg v. St. Louis Cordage Co.(1909) 135 Mo. App. 553, 116 S. W. 461. See also Anderson v.
Caldwell (1912) 242 Mo. 201, 146 S. W. 444.
The classification of contracts as executory and executed is
also common. Sooy v. Winter (1915) 188 Mo. App. 150, 175
S. W. 132.
A statutory classification, important for procedural purposes,
is suggested by R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 2160. In a certain type of
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written and signed contract, consideration is presumed (but of
course not conclusively), and does not have to be pleaded. In
all other contracts, the consideration must be pleaded. County
of Montgomery v. Auchley (1887) 92 Mo. 126, 4 S. W. 425.
Section 7. FORMAL CONTRACTS.
Formal contracts are
(a) Contracts under seal,
(b) Recognizances,
(c) Negotiable instruments.
Comment:
a. Other contracts which by statute are required to be in
writing or in some prescribed form are not classed as formal
contracts. The classification is made for convenience of refer-
ence and designation. Contracts here classified as formal, in
many cases, at least, have some characteristics analogous to
those of contracts classified as informal. Promissory notes and
bills of exchange, especially, are often called informal contracts
for this reason. In many states also the effect of seals has been
abolished by statute, thereby doing away with Class (a).
Annotation:
Before 1893, when the revolutionary statute was adopted af-
fecting the significance of a seal in the law of contracts, now
known as R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 2159, this Section of the Restate-
ment would have been in accord with Missouri law. Since 1893,
Class (a) in Section 7 has been done away with, except as to the
conveyance of a legal title to real estate by a corporation
possessing a seal. See Pullis v. Pullis Bros. Iron Co. (1900) 157
Mo. 565, 57 S. W. 1095; Albers v. Acme Paving & Crusher Co.
(1916) 196 Mo. App. 265, 194 S. W. 61. In State ex rel. v. Parke-
Davis & Co. (1915) 191 Mo. App. 219, 177 S. W. 1070, the court
expressly stated that a bond is "no different from any other
simple contract." In the terminology of the Restatement, a
simple contract is an informal contract.
It should be remembered that in Missouri all sealed contracts,
including conveyances of real estate by a corporation, can be
impeached for a want of consideration. R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec.
1404.
Adopting the Restatement's classification, we may say that
formal contracts in Missouri are (a) contracts in the nature of
conveyances under seal by a corporation having a seal, (b)
recognizances, and (c) negotiable instruments. (A conveyance
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is not a contract unless it contains a promise. Some convey-
ances contain promises, often resting upon the grantee after ac-
ceptance, such as a promise to pay off a mortgage. Some con-
veyances are not contracts because they contain no promises.)
Section 8. CONTRACTS UNDER SEAL.
A contract under seal is a contract expressed in a writing
which is sealed and delivered by the promisor.
Comment:
a. The rules governing the formation of sealed contracts are
stated in Sections 95-110. When peculiar incidents are attached
to such contracts after their formation, attention is called to
these incidents in appropriate connections.
Annotation:
In Missouri since 1845, a statutory designation of a sealed
contract has been "specialty." R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 1404. The
purpose of this statute was to make specialties the same as
simple (informal) written contracts with respect to the element
of consideration.
The Missouri Statute of Limitations makes no distinction be-
tween writings "whether sealed or unsealed." R. S. Mo. 1919,
Sec. 1316.
Section 9. RECOGNIZANCES.
A recognizance is an acknowledgment in court by the recog-
nizor that he is bound to make a certain payment unless a speci-
fied condition is performed.
Comment:
a. Recognizances are in use chiefly to secure (1) the attend-
ance in court at a future day of the recognizor, or (2) the prose-
cution of an action, or (3) the payment of bail.
Annotation:
This is in accord with the law of Missouri. "A recognizance
is in all cases a contract acknowledged by the parties and entered
or filed in the records of the court." State v. Wilson (1915) 265
Mo. 1, 175 S. W. 603. This case points out essential differences
between a recognizance and a bail bond, which is also a contract.
A recognizance and a cost bond are compared in Calhoun v. Gray
(1910) 150 Mo. App. 591, 131 S. W. 478. "There is no sub-
stantial difference between a recognizance at common law and
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the one provided for by our statute." State v. Poston (1876)
63 Mo. 521.
Section 10. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Negotiable instruments are such bills of exchange, promissory
notes, and bonds as are payable to bearer, or to the order of a
specified person. By statutes, in many States, bills of lading
and warehouse receipts, also, if running to bearer or to the order
of a specified person, are negotiable.
Comment:
a. The foregoing Section is inserted for completeness of
enumeration. The instruments referred to are to be treated of
in a Restatement especially devoted thereto. Certificates of
shares of stock are also made negotiable by statute in some
States, but such certificates do not usually contain promises.
Annotation:
Bills and notes are governed in Missouri by the chapter in
R. S. Mo. 1919 beginning with Sec. 787. Warehouse receipts
and bills of lading are governed by the chapter in R. S. Mo. 1919
beginning with Sec. 13450.
This Section is in accord with Missouri decisions if the words
designating the enumerated classes are construed somewhat
broadly. Some types of certificates of deposit are promissory
notes and, therefore, negotiable. Howey Co. v. Cole (1925) 219
Mo. App. 34, 269 S. W. 955. Another type of certificate of de-
posit is non-negotiable. Aufderheide v. Moeller (1926) 221 Mo.
App. 442, 281 S. W. 965. A trade acceptance is a bill of ex-
change and, therefore, negotiable. Fitzwilliams v. Northwest-
ern Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1928) 10 S. W. (2d) 334.
Section 11. INFORMAL CONTRACTS.
Informal contracts are all others than those enumerated as
formal contracts in Section 7.
Comment:
a. Under this definition a written contract is an informal con-
tract unless it falls within one of the classes enumerated in Sec-
tion 7. As stated in the Comment to that Section, the classifica-
tion of contracts as formal and informal is for convenience of
reference and designation. Many contracts classified as in-
formal have some requisites of form.
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b. By the English Statute of Frauds, enacted in 1677, a num-
ber of contracts were made unenforceable unless evidenced by a
writing. A great part of this statute has been re-enacted in all
of the United States, and other contracts besides those enumer-
ated in the English statute have frequently been subjected to
the same formal requirement. Rules applicable to such statutes
are stated in Chapter 8.
c. In a number of States by statute a written promise is pre-
sumed to have been made for sufficient consideration, though
lack of consideration, if proved, establishes the legal nullity of
the promise. In a very few States, the local statutes enact that
a written promise, like a sealed contract at common law, shall
be binding without consideration.
Informal contracts as that term is used in the Restatement of
this Subject are often called simple contracts.
Annotation:
Informal contracts, as here defined, are in Missouri usually
called simple contracts. County of Montgomery v. Auchley
(1887) 92 Mo. 126, 4 S. W. 425. By reason of R. S. Mo. 1919,
Sec. 2159, practically all sealed contracts are now converted
legally into simple (informal) contracts. State ex rel. v. Parke-
Davis & Co. (1915) 191 Mo. App. 219, 177 S. W. 1070.
By R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 2160, certain written promises are
presumed (but not conclusively) to be for a sufficient.considera-
tion. Terry v. Terry (Mo. App. 1919) 217 S. W. 842; Johnson
v. Woodmen (1906) 119 Mo. App. 98, 95 S. W. 951. As to nature
of written promises affected by the statute, see Jeff ries v. Hager
(1853) 18 Mo. 272.
Section 12. UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL CONTRACTS.
A unilateral contract is one in which no promisor receives a
promise as consideration for his promise. A bilateral contract
is one in which there are mutual promises between two parties
to the contract; each party being both a promisor and a promisee.
Comment:
a. In a unilateral contract the exchange for the promise is
something other than a promise; in a bilateral contract, promises
are exchanged for one another.
b. There must always be at least two parties to a contract,
whether unilateral or bilateral, and there must usually be an
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expression of assent by each. In many cases, however, a prom-
ise becomes a contract even though no return promise is made
by the promisee. In such cases the legal duty is unilateral, rest-
ing on the promisor alone. The correlative legal right is also
unilateral, being possessed by the promisee alone. The state-
ment often made that unless both parties are bound neither is
bound is quite erroneous, as a universal statement.
c. A unilateral contract is in a very real sense, as its name
implies, a one-sided contract. There are two parties to the con-
tract, it is true, and an expression of assent on the part of each
is usually necessary to its formation; but one of the requisites
for making the contract should not be confused with the con-
tract itself. The contract is merely the promise, not the mutual
expression of assent nor the consideration paid for the promise.
In a bilateral contract, on the other hand, as there are con-
tractual promises on both sides, the contract is properly called
bilateral.
d. Contracts are possible where there are more than two par-
ties, but in disputes between any two of them, the principles ap-
plicable to the simpler forms of contracts will generally aid in
the analysis of the rights and duties of the parties.
e. Contracts are also possible under Section 75 (2) where A
promises B in consideration of B's promise to C, or in considera-
tion of C's promise to A. The promises in such cases are not
mutual, and, therefore, do not fall within the definition of bi-
lateral contract. In view of possible differences in legal treat-
ment they may properly be kept separate.
Annotation:
In Missouri cases, each one of the contrasting terms, uni-
lateral and bilateral, is used with two separate and distinct
meanings.
As to Mutuality. Sometimes unilateral indicates an alleged
contract which, on examination, turns out to be an unaccepted
gratuitous offer, and therefore not a binding contract at all.
The transaction is one-sided as every gratuitous offer is one-
sided. In Royal Brewing Co. v. Uncle Sam Oil Co. (1920) 205
Mo. App. 616, 226 S. W. 656, the court said: "Is the contract
void for lack of mutuality-is it unilateral? The rule in respect
to mutuality is that the contract must obligate each party to do
something in consideration of what the other does, or is to do.
It is frequently difficult in a given contract to say whether this
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rule is complied with." See also Laclede Construction Go. v.
Tudor Iron Works (1902) 169 Mo. 137, 69 S. W. 384; Maccalum
Printing Co. v. Graphite Compendius Co. (1910) 150 Mo. App.
383, 130 S. W. 836. Sometimes bilateral indicates a challenged
contract, which on examination is found to possess mutuality
and is therefore binding. In Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.
(1926) 313 Mo. 552, 281 S. W. 744, there was an option which at
first might have been a mere offer unsupported by any considera-
tion, but shortly afterwards there was certainly an acceptance
by performance. The court said: "Even though the Walker
option may have been unilateral in its inception, when Walker,
in reliance thereon, expended time and money in endeavoring to
procure a purchaser for the stock, such acts upon his part, under
the holdings of this court and our courts of appeals, made the
contract bilateral and binding upon both parties."
As to Promises. Sometimes unilateral contract in Missouri
decisions means, as always in the Restatement, a true contract
where the consideration on one side is executed and the contract
consists of only one promise. The transaction is binding, but is
one-sided because the duty to perform is one-sided. In Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Company (1909) 220
Mo. 522, 119 S. W. 400, the majority opinion by Lamm, J., quotes
with approval from William L. Clark's note to American Cotton
Oil Co. v. Kirk (1895) 15 C. C. A. 543, where Mr. Clark uses the
term unilateral exactly as used in the Restatement. Cal Hirsch
& Sons Iron & Rail Co. v. Paragould & M. R. Co. (1910) 148
Mo. App. 173, 127 S. W. 623, refers to both separate meanings
of the one word unilateral. An ordinary option contract, where
an offer cannot be withdrawn because of an executed considera-
tion, is a unilateral contract. Aiple-Hemmelmann Real Estate
Co. v. Spelbrink (1908) 211 Mo. 671, 111 S. W. 480. In German
v. Gilbert (1900) 83 Mo. App. 411, the court described a bilateral
contract as one "where the consideration for a promise is a
promise." To the same effect is Wilt v. Hammond (1914) 179
Mo. App. 406, 165 S. W. 362.
With the Restatement's distinctive meaning, unilateral was
probably first used by Judge John F. Dillon in Barrett v. Dean
(1866) 21 Iowa 423. Undoubtedly Professor Langdell of Har-
vard popularized, the use of the terms unilateral and bilateral
with exclusive reference to promises. See WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS, Sec. 13, note.
Section 13. VOIDABLE CONTRACTS.
A voidable contract is one where one or more parties thereto
have the power, by a manifestation of election to do so, to avoid
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the legal relations created by the contract; or by ratification of
the contract to make it valid and enforceable.
Comment:
a. Typical instances of voidable contracts are those where one
or both parties are infants; or where the contract was induced
by fraud, mistake, or duress; or where breach of a warranty or
of another promise justifies the injured party in rescinding a
bargain or avoiding its legal effect. Usually the power to avoid
is confined to one party to the contract, but where, for instance,
both parties are infants, or where both parties enter into the
contract under such a mutual mistake as affords ground for
rescission by a court of equity, the contract may be voidable by
either one of the parties.
b. The consequence of avoidance in some cases is to entitle
the party who avoids the contract to be restored to a position as
good as that which he occupied immediately before the forma-
tion of the contract; in other cases to leave the situation of the
parties in the same condition as at the time of the avoidance.
c. In many cases it is a condition qualifying a power of avoid-
ance that the original situation of the parties can be and shall
be restored at least substantially, but this is not necessarily the
case. An infant, for instance, in many jurisdictions is allowed
to avoid his contract without this qualification, so that when the
infant exercises his power the parties frequently are left in a
very different situation from that which existed when the con-
tract was made.
d. In some contracts included under the designation of void-
able contracts, it is unnecessary for one who wishes to avoid
them to take promptly the position of an actor. No manifesta-
tion of intention is necessary until an action is brought against
him. He may, however, by ratifying the transaction make the
contract enforceable.
e. Where both parties have a power of avoidance the propriety
of calling the transaction a voidable contract rather than calling
the transaction void, is due to the fact that action is necessary
in order to prevent the contract from producing the ordinary
legal consequences of a contract; and often this action in order
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to be effectual must be taken promptly. Moreover, ratification
by either party may terminate his.power of avoidance.
Illustrations:
1. A, an infant, sells and delivers his watch to B, an adult,
in return for the latter's promise to pay $20. There is a
unilateral contract whereby B becomes owner of the watch
and is under an enforceable duty to pay $20 to A, but A
has the power of extinguishing his own right to the money
and the promisor's duty to pay it and of revesting in himself
the ownership of the watch.
2. A, by fraud, induces B to make a promise to pay A
money in consideration of goods delivered by A to B. There
is a contract, but the fraudulent representations of A give B
a power of disaffirmance by tendering back to A within a
reasonable time the goods received from him.
3. A, an infant, makes a bilateral agreement with B, an
adult, the infant promising to pay money .and the adult
promising to deliver a chattel. This is enforceable against
B, but not against A, who may successfully demur to any
declaration setting forth all the operative facts. If A has
not previously disaffirmed he will have the power of ratifica-
tion upon attaining his majority.
4. A, by fraud, induces B to promise to pay, money for
certain advice which A gives. This promise creates no duty
in B, but is not wholly void, because it can be validated by
ratification by B after he learns the facts.
Special Note: A promise or set of promises for breach of
which the law neither gives a remedy nor otherwise recog-
nizes a duty of performance by the promisor, is often called
a void contract, but this is a contradiction in terms in view
of the definition of contract in Section 1.
In JENKS, DIGEST OF ENGLISH CIVIL LAW, Section 182, a
contract is defined as including any agreement where the
parties intended to create a legal obligation; and only under
this artificial nomenclature could an agreement by which
the parties intended to create such an obligation but which
did not accomplish their intention, properly be called a void
contract.
Annotation:
This Section is in general accord with the Missouri decisions.
"When an infant makes a promise in any business transaction,
though not absolutely void, it is voidable by him." Kerr v. Bell
(1869) 44 Mo. 120. R. S. Mo. 1919 Sec. 2173 for procedural
purposes limits the common law method of ratifying infants'
contracts. "If a party defrauded misunderstands the nature
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of the contract so that the minds of the parties never meet on
its terms, it is void. But, if, understanding its terms, he is in-
duced to sign it by fraudulent representations outside of its
terms, it is voidable and must be set aside before the party de-
frauded can maintain an action." Metropolitan Paving Co. v.
Brown-Crummer Inv. Co. (1925) 309 Mo. 638, 274 S. W. 815.
This case holds that the assignment of a voidable contract is it-
self a voidable contract. State ex rel. v. Stuart (1905) 111 Mo.
App. 478, 86 S. W. 471 construes R. S. Mo. 1919 Sec. 1238, which
provides a special method of pleading, in a reply, defendant's
fraud so as to avoid an alleged discharge relied upon in the
answer. In Broadwater v. Dame (1847) 10 Mo. 277, drunken-
ness of a party was held to render a contract voidable. In
Rogers v. Warren (1898) 75 Mo. App. 271, the facts justified an
instruction on the theory that drunkenness rendered the contract
void. When a person of unsound mind executes a promissory
note and the person with whom he deals is ignorant of the men-
tal infirmity, such note is not void but only voidable. Hill-Dodge
Banking Co. v. Loomis (1909) 140 Mo. App. 62, 119 S. W. 967.
What will "constitute duress to avoid a contract," is thoroughly
considered in Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Begley (1923) 298
Mo. 684, 252 S. W. 76.
From the case last cited and from several of the other cases
cited above, it will be seen that in Missouri the term void con-
tract is used as a term of convenience, to contrast with voidable
contract. Apparently the Institute favors the abandonment of
the term void contract which is logically a solecism.
Missouri seems to be one of the "many jurisdictions," re-
ferred to in comment c, in which an infant can avoid a contract
without necessarily putting the other party back into his original
position. "The privilege of repudiating a contract is accorded
an infant because of the indiscretion incident to his immaturity;
and if he were required to restore an equivalent, where he has
wasted or squandered the property or consideration received,
the privilege would be of no avail when most needed." Craig
v. VanBebber (1890) 100 Mo. 584, 13 S. W. 906. To the same
effect: Ridgeway v. Herbert (1899) 150 Mo. 606, 51 S. W. 1040;
Eagleburger v. Shelton (Mo. App. 1925) 272 S. W. 698. The
general rule as to statu quo is also relaxed when special reasons
exist in an equitable suit to rescind a contract on the ground of
fraud. Parish v. Casner (Mo. 1926) 282 S. W. 392; Maupin v.
Mo. State Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1919) 214 S. W. 398.
Section 14. UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS.
An unenforceable contract is one which the law does not en-
force by legal proceedings, but recognizes in some indirect or col-
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lateral way as creating a duty of performance, though there has
been no ratification.
Comment:
a. Both voidable and unenforceable contracts, as they have
been classified in the Restatement of this Subject, frequently in-
volve a power on the part of one or the other of the parties to
create the full contractual rights and duties of an ordinary con-
tract. If this were their only effect they might be classified to-
gether; but in the transactions classified as unenforceable some
legal consequences, other than the creation of a power of rati-
fication, follow without further action by either party.
Illustrations:
1. A is indebted to B, but the Statute of Limitations has
barred the remedy. A has the power to make a contract
without consideration by making a new promise or part
payment of the debt (see Section 86). But even without
such further acts, legal consequences may flow from the
barred debt. If the creditor has security, he may apply it
towards payment of the debt. If he can obtain service of
process on the debtor in another jurisdiction, the debt may
be enforced, unless enforcement is prohibited by the laws of
that jurisdiction.
2. A has a contract with his government. This cannot be
enforced by ordinary procedure, for even if the government
allows itself to be sued, it does not allow execution to be
levied against it. Yet the legal consequences of the contract
show that what is promised A is due him as of right and not
as a favor. Any money ultimately obtained by him will be
regarded as money to which he was entitled under the con-
tract. Therefore, if he becomes bankrupt after payment
is due, but before it has been made or an appropriation
voted, the money will belong to his trustee in bankruptcy
and will not be dealt with as after-acquired property.
3. A makes an oral purchase of goods for an agreed price
of $1000. There is no delivery or part payment, and be-
cause of the local Statute of Frauds the bargain is unen-
forceable. A insures the goods as owner. The insurer
cannot defeat a claim under the policy on the ground that
A did not own the goods.
Annotation:
Missouri courts have used the term non-enforceable in de-
scribing this type of contract. Donovan v. Brewing Co. (1902)
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92 Mo. App. 341 (Statute of Frauds). They have also used the
term voidable to express the same idea. Shelton v. Thompson
(1902) 96 Mo. App. 327, 70 S. W. 256. Lowenstein v. Queen
Ins. Co. (1910) 227 Mo. 100, 127 S. W. 72, recognizes the differ-
ence between a contract unenforceable by reason of lapse of
time and a void contract.
See also Sec. 86 (Statute of Limitations) and Sec. 87 (dis-
charge in bankruptcy).
In distinguishing between voidable and unenforceable con-
tracts, the Restatement follows SIR WILLIAM R. ANSON, LAW OF
CONTRACT.
As to unenforceable contracts against municipalities in Mis-
souri, see Yost v. Dallas County (1915) 236 U. S. 50, 59 L. ed.
460, approving State ex rel. v. Hager (1887) 91 Mo. 452, 3 S. W.
844.
Chapter 2
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS-GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Section 15. PARTIES REQUIRED.
There must be at least two parties in a contract, but may be
any greater number.
Comment:
a. It is not possible under existing law for a man to make a
contract with himself. This rule is one of substance and inde-
pendent of mere procedural requirements. Even though a man
has different capacities, as for instance as trustee, as executor,
as partner, as an individual, it is impossible as matter of sub-
stantive law for him by his own individual will or expressions to
contract with himself. As will be seen under the following sec-
tions, it is another question whether a contract may be formed
in which the same person is one of several on one side of a bar-
gain, and either alone or with others a party to the other side.
The question is also distinct whether a contract is necessarily
discharged where one party becomes both obligor and obligee
and there are no other parties to the contract.
b. Several persons may act together, as in the case of a
partnership, either as promisors or promisees, and where parties
are thus acting jointly, they are for many purposes regarded as
a single unit. But there are also contracts in which a number
of persons are parties and where each has several interests.
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Thus any number of persons may promise a certain performance
to one or to any number of persons in return for acts or return
promises, and all may be part of the same transaction.
Illustrations:
1. A, B, C and D enter into a written contract by which
A makes certain promises to B, other promises to C, other
promises to D. B, C and D jointly make a promise to A in
return, or severally promise different things to A in return.
In either case there is a contract, and numerous variations
may be made from this illustration in regard to the number
of parties and the various promises which they may make
jointly or severally, or in groups of two or more.
2. A, as trustee, signs and seals a promise to himself as
an individual or as an executor. The instrument is void.
Annotation:
This is in accord with Missouri law. "At least two parties
are essential to a contract." Watson Seminary v. Pike County
Court (1899) 149 Mo. 57, 50 S. W. 880. "It is elementary law
that a trustee is not permitted to purchase at his own sale."
Newton v. Rebenack (1901) 90 Mo. App. 650. For a case ap-
plying the principle to two transportation corporations with
interlocking directorates, see Johnson v. United Railways Co.
(1920) 281 Mo. 90, 219 S. W. 38. For a case declining to apply
the principle to a trust company and a brokerage company, see
Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (1926) 313 Mo. 552, 281 S. W.
744.
It should be remembered that if a trustee buys from his bene-
ficiary, the contract is not void but voidable if circumstances
justify avoidance. Guy v. Mayes (1911) 235 Mo. 390, 138 S. W.
510.
It should also be remembered that one individual can effectual-
ly declare himself the trustee for another person. A declaration
of trust is not necessarily a contract, and may be valid even if
the beneficiary is not informed of the trust. Mize v. Bates
County National Bank (1895) 60 Mo. App. 358.
Section 16. JOINT, SEVERAL, JOINT AND SEVERAL PROMISORS
AND PROMISEES.
Where there are more promisors than one in a contract, some
or all of them may promise jointly as a unit, or some or all of
them may each promise severally or some or all of them may
promise jointly and severally. Where there are more promisees
than one in a contract, promises may be made to some or all of
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them jointly as a unit or to some or all of them severally, or to
some or all of them jointly and severally.
Comment:
a. Procedure in English and American courts in actions at
law, when there has been no statutory change fusing legal and
equitable procedure, permits but two sides to a litigation, that
of the plaintiff and that of the defendant. Either the side of
the plaintiff or that of the defendant may consist of more than
one person, but all the persons joined as plaintiffs must assert
a common right, and all the persons joined as defendants must
be charged with a common duty.
b. As matter of substantive law, however, an indefinite num-
ber of persons may contract with one another; each one of the
persons or groups of the persons promising either one or any
number of the others, whether dealing with them individually
or jointly as a unit. If all the promises are entered into as part
of a single transaction, they form part of one contract.
c. In equity there has never been the requirement that the
parties to a suit must consist of merely two units, one seeking
to enforce a right against the other. On the contrary, any num-
ber of diverse and conflicting interests can be dealt with under
equity procedure; and under the code procedure, now enacted in
most of the United States, the same thing is true.
Annotation:
This rule of the common law has been modified by R. S. Mo.
1919, Sec. 2155, which provides that joint contracts shall be
deemed to be joint and several. The Missouri modification ap-
plies to promisors but not to promisees. Dewey v. Carey (1875)
60 Mo. 224.
The first sentence of the Section is in accord with Missouri
law except that promisors using apt words to bind themselves
jointly at common law, are bound jointly and severally. The
second sentence is in accord with Missouri law.
The matter is treated fully in Chapter 5, post.
Section 17. WHEN A PERSON MAY BE BOTH PROMISOR AND
PROMISEE.
A contract may be formed between two or more persons acting
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as a unit and one or more but fewer than all of these persons,
acting either singly or with other persons.
Comment:
a. This Section is applicable to both unilateral and bilateral
contracts, and like the other Sections in this Chapter is appli-
cable both to formal and to informal contracts.
b. The rule does not touch upon the rightfulness of making
such contracts as fall within its terms. In a particular case such
a contract might be voidable for fraud or for other reasons.
Illustrations:
1. A becomes a member of an unincorporated society, and
by so doing promises to pay dues to the society. He is bound
by a contract.
2. A, a trustee of an estate jointly with B, enters into a
written agreement by which he individually promises to
buy and A and B as trustees promise to sell a piece of land
belonging to the trust. This is a contract; and, though it
is voidable by the beneficiaries if made without either their
consent or the authority of a court, it is enforceable unless
the beneficiaries elect to avoid it.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law.
Partners. The common law rule preventing one partner from
suing the partnership, has been so modified by the statute mak-
ing all firm contracts joint and several, that a partner, to whom
was executed a note by the partnership, may in his individual
name sue the other partner to compel him to pay his share of
such note. Willis v. Barron (1898) 143 Mo. 450, 45 S. W. 289.
Apparently the procedural doctrine of this case has not been
applied to contracts other than negotiable instruments. Cald-
well v. Dismukes (1905) 111 Mo. App. 570, 86 S. W. 270. A con-
tract between a firm and one partner, evidenced merely by a
book entry, probably could be enforced only by an equitable suit
for dissolution. See Margolin, Actions at Law Between
Partners in Missouri (1928) 13 ST. Louis L. REV., 201. For a
note comparing the doctrine of Willis v. Barron with the law of
other states, see 21 A. L. R. 21. The fact that the same
person is both co-maker and co-payee in a note, if he assign his
interest to the other payee, will not prevent the latter from re-
covering on the note. Smith v. Gregory (1881) 75 Mo. 121.
Other useful cases are: Brockman v. Fehrenbach (Mo. App.
1922) 238 S. W. 1087; O'Day v. Sanford (1909) 138 Mo. App.
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343, 122 S. W. 3; Gilliam v. Loeb (1908) 131 Mo. App. 70, 109
S. W. 835.
Unincorporated Associations. In Missouri Bottlers' Assn. v.
Fennerty (1899) 81 Mo. App. 525, it was held that an unincor-
porated association was not a partnership, a valid contract ex-
isted between the association and one member, and a suit at law
could be maintained against that member by the association's
assignee. The validity of such contracts is clearly recognized
in State ex rel. v. Kansas City Live Stock Exchange (1908) 211
Mo. 181, 109 S. W. 675. See also Lindsay v. Hotchkiss (1917)
195 Mo. App. 563, 193 S. W. 902; Kuhl v. Meyer (1890) 42 Mo.
App. 474.
Section 18. NECESSITY FOR CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY.
No one can be bound by contract who has not legal capacity
to incur at least voidable contractual obligations. Contractual
incapacity may be total or may be only partial.
Comment:
a. Capacity, as here used, means legal power. The legal
powers possessed by natural or artificial persons can be set forth
only when the various classes are separately considered.
b. It is only where his contractual incapacity is total that it
can be laid down broadly that a party to a transaction cannot
enter into a contract.
Annotation:
This is in accord with Missouri law. Under the common law
of coverture in Missouri before 1899, a married woman's alleged
contract was void. Bragg v. Israel (1900) 86 Mo. App. 338.
An infant has no power to make a contract appointing an at-
torney. Curtis v. Alexander (Mo. 1923) 257 S. W. 432; Turner
v. Bondalier (1888) 31 Mo. App. 582. R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 482
takes away from a person adjudicated insane, all contractual
power as to ordinary business affairs. Herman v. St. Francois
County Bank (Mo. App. 1927) 291 S. W. 156. But marriage is
not an ordinary business contract. Payne v. Burdette (1900)
84 Mo. App. 332. Apart from the statute last cited, an insane
person's contract is void or voidable according to circumstances.
McKenzie v. Donnel (1899) 151 Mo. 431, 52 S. W. 214.
To Be Continued
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